Introduction
Over the last twenty years the market for sovereign debt has rapidly expanded. Financial liberalization has favored the emergence of private lenders.
From 1990 to 1999 for example, the total amount of debt outstanding in developing countries has increased from 1,183 to 1,865 billions of US dollars (source: IMF). In the meantime, the market for sovereign debt has also experienced serious crises. The unilateral moratorium on debt service declared by Mexico in 1982 was followed by several defaults in Latin America during the 1980's. More recently, the Russian default in 1998 provided additional evidence that lending to sovereign states requires further advances in sovereign debt modelling and country risk management.
Key to the sovereign credit relationship is the lack of enforcement mechanism for the debt contract. Lenders to sovereigns cannot take legal action to seize the borrower's assets in case of default. In particular, securing debt has less coercive power than with corporate credit relationship. Consequently, it has been argued (see e.g. Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) ) that sovereign debt service depends much less on her ability to pay than on her willingness to pay. This strategic dimension complicates the sovereign debt pricing problem. It places renegotiations as a central element in sovereign credit relationship. The economic literature, surveyed in particular by Eaton and Fernandez (1995) , has identified several rationales for the sovereign to accept entering into renegotiations. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , Atkeson (1991) or Cole and Kehoe (1998) argue the sovereign needs to maintain her reputation on international debt market to preserve future financing. Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) and Rosenthal (1991) claim however that the reputation argument alone cannot sustain positive lending if the sovereign has alternative sources of financing (such as cash-in-advance contracts). For that reason, Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) advocate for the threat of economic sanctions as an incentive for repayment (should the creditor keep this threat credible).
Alternatively, Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) propose to reward the borrowers that actually pay out their debt.
It is also clearly in the interest of the lender to enter into renegotiations.
If an agreement cannot be reached, the sovereign default leads to what Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1989) define as "stonewalling": The creditor refuses to grant relief and the debtor refuses to impose austerity in her country. Over the 1990's several countries including Bolivia, Costa Rica, Niger and Uganda among others got out of this deadlock with an "exit plan". Part of the debt was bought back with the help of international organizations and the credit relationship with the lender was terminated. Empirical evidence shows that debt forgiveness following exit deals is by large amounts.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for pricing sovereign debt incorporating all commonly used types of renegotiations that avoid the exit deal. Beyond serving as a debt pricing and a risk management tool, the model aims at bringing additional insight on the impact of the type of renegotiations on sovereign debt value and default risk. In particular, it determines sovereign debt capacity for various types of contracts.
In this paper we examine reduction and rescheduling deals as they represent two different approaches to resolve default on sovereign debt. Historically, the response to the Mexican crisis in 1982 was the Baker Plan set up in 1985. The plan was grounded on the analysis that sovereigns face illiquidity problems. It therefore called for rescheduling debt while asking sovereigns to commit to foster growth in their economies. In the 1990's the U.S. policy shifted from debt rescheduling to debt reduction deals with the Brady Plan.
This plan was grounded on the analysis that sovereigns face debt overhang.
Debt reductions are organized through the conversion of private loans into so-called Brady bonds. Thus, both the lender and the sovereign should benefit from debt relief. This view has received support from economic theory. Sachs (1986) or Krugman (1988) argue that debt overhang (i) results in credit rationing which prevents the sovereign from financing profitable investment opportunities and (ii) discourages the sovereign to increase her output as the accruing benefits would be captured by foreign lenders through higher debt service. Froot (1989) develops a formal model where debt overhang places the sovereign on the "wrong" side of the debt Laffer curve, thereby measuring the benefits of debt relief. Furthermore, Husain (1993) claims that debt reduction may be welfare-improving even when debt overhang is not so compelling.
These last two authors however also examine the possibility to mix reduction with rescheduling (see also Boot and Kanatas (1995) and Fernandez-Ruiz (2000) ). As a matter of fact, these "debt packages" are the rule rather than the exception. x  e  d  i  n  t  e  r  e  s  t  r  a  t  e  d  e  b  t  -r  e  d  u  c  t  i  o  n  b  o  n  d  s  ,  o  r  (  i  i  i  )  t  o  r  e  s  c  h  e  d  u  l  e  e  x  i  s  t  i  n  g  l  o  a  n  s  b  y  p  r  o  v  i  d  i  n  g   n  e  w  m  o  n  e  y  .  E  a  c  h  o  f  t  h  e  s  e  o  p  t  i  o  n  s  w  a  s  a  c  c  e  p  t  e  d  b  y  b  a  n  k  s  a  c  c  o  u  n  t  i  n  g  f  o  r  r  e  s  p  e  c  t  i  v  e  l  y  4  9  %  ,   4  1  %  a  n  d  1  0  %  o  f  t  h  e  l  o  a  n  s  (  s  e  e  U  n  a  l  ,  D  e  m  i  r  g  ü  ç  -K  u  n  t  a  n  d  L  e  u  n  g  (  1  9  9 is a standard Brownian motion and µ and σ are two constants.
In this set-up, the stochastic process (q 
Sovereign debt value
The debt contract value depends on the reimbursement schedule and is contingent to the process (q t , t ≥ 0) and to the sovereign default policy. For simplicity, we use the terms "lender" and "bank" interchangeably.
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The bank and the sovereign commit to a long term credit relationship, which justifies the infinite horizon of the model. The sovereign must pay a continuous debt service s unless she unilaterally defaults. In this case, an exit deal solves the crisis: The bank incurs a debt forgiveness and the sovereign is exposed to economic sanctions on her exports.
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The sanctions consist in reducing the trend of exports from µ to m < µ. This specification is equivalent to a dollar sanction that amounts to the present value of the reduced future cash flows.
The sovereign opts for the exit deal when her exports reach the endogenous threshold H < q. The sovereign and the bank agree on the payment of a fraction α of the nominal s/r that puts an end to the contract. The fraction α may be interpreted as the collateral of the loan. In some cases, it may represent the value of sovereign assets abroad that the lender can seize.
We call αs/r the recovery value of debt. We note τ 
it follows that
From equation (1) 
Sovereign default policy
Sovereign resources stem from domestic product (I) and exportations. The total wealth writes
keeping in mind that after τ H , the drift of q t is m. Which yields (see Appendix A for a proof)
with
From equation (2) we see sovereign wealth consists in the domestic product plus the present value of a perpetual stream of exports starting from q and growing at rate µ minus the expected loss due to economic sanctions.
This loss is the difference in perpetuities starting from H with corresponding growth rates times the present value of one dollar contingent on default. In the absence of renegotiations, the default threshold H * maximizing sovereign equity e is given by the smooth pasting condition
We therefore obtain
In the subsequent cases where debt is renegotiable, sovereign wealth as well as debt value given by equations (1) and (2) 
The optimal default threshold of the sovereign trades off the expected cost of servicing the debt and the expected economic sanctions when not servicing the debt (including the payment upon the exit deal). Thus, a higher debt service as well as a higher interest rate increase H * . Also, a higher α implies a higher cost of defaulting. For a given µ, a higher m implies more lenient sanctions, so the sovereign raises her default threshold. Conversely, for a given m, a higher µ means tougher sanctions.
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Finally, uncertainty in our model surrounds the level of sovereign exports and gives the sovereign the option of waiting to default. A higher exports volatility increases the value of this option and therefore lowers the optimal threshold. 
The debt reduction deal
In our rational expectations model, the bank anticipates to lose αs/r during the exit deal following default. We now examine the case where the bank and the sovereign may avoid the exit deal by setting up renegotiations. In this case, the default of the sovereign is the starting point of a bargaining process. We assume renegotiations may occur only once.
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In this section, we focus on a debt reduction proposal. Next, we will consider renegotiations on rescheduling debt.
Sovereign debt value
Following the terminology defined by Sachs (1990) , the debt reduction deal consists in reducing the net present value of due payments. The sovereign and the bank agree on reducing the amount of debt, i.e. the sovereign must then pay the continuous debt service βs. Parameter β is interpreted as a recovery rate or alternatively (1 − β) stands for the debt write-off in case of a debt reduction deal. Consequently, the sovereign adopts the exit threshold There is room for renegotiation since debt reduction lowers the present value of due payments (which is unfavorable to the bank), but it also lowers the probability of an exit deal (which is favorable to the bank). Note that upon the exit deal, the lender gets a fraction α of the renegotiated amount of debt, that is αβs/r.
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Sovereign debt initial value is given by 
Endogenous debt reduction
We determine the debt recovery rate β as the solution of a Nash bargaining game. When q reaches H * , successful renegotiations mean that the lender does not receive the recovery value αs/r but instead holds a non-renegotiable debt with coupon βs and exit threshold βH *
. Hence, the incremental value accruing to the lender is
Similarly, the incremental value accruing to the sovereign at the time of
Since sovereign wealth given by equation (1) may be reinterpreted as a postrenegotiations value, we have that
Let η denote the bargaining power of the bank. The debt reduction β satisfies
and is solved numerically. Figure 1 plots the renegotiations total surplus
) as a function of the debt write-off for various balances of power. ) and therefore increases β *
. On the other hand, a higher σ implies a higher probability of sovereign default, which makes it worthwhile for the lender and the sovereign to agree on a significant debt write-off. This effect dominates for low levels of σ and is then more than offset by the first effect on the optimal renegotiation threshold. An implication of this result is that, all other things equal, we should observe the highest debt reductions for moderately risky sovereigns. For sovereigns with a low level of risk, the likelihood of default is insufficient to justify a significant debt write-off. And as for very risky sovereigns, they have an incentive to delay renegotiations to a point where significant debt reduction can no longer be profitable to both parties. • (which is equivalent to the slope of 1/r = 20 in our Figure 3 ). However, as indebtedness increases, debt market value is reduced by a default risk premium. Moreover, the humped shape of the debt Laffer curve represents the benefits of debt reduction. If debt service is set above the level that maximizes debt value, the sovereign is said to be on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve. In this region, a debt reduction increases debt value and is therefore beneficial to both parties (see e.g. Krugman (1988) or Bowe and Dean (1997) for a related analysis).
The value of renegotiable debt
The humped shape of the debt Laffer curve also refers to the notion of sovereign debt capacity. The top of the curve represents the maximum amount of debt (in value) that the sovereign can take on. From Figure 3 , we see that the top of the debt Laffer curve corresponds to a debt-to-exports ratio of around 90%. This means debt reduction deals should be implemented well before the sovereign country is considered as "severely indebted" by World Bank standards. Also, we note that debt capacity increases with the sovereign exports level. Banks have an incentive to lend more to sovereigns who can be significantly punished for defaulting and who lower their exit threshold accordingly. the sovereign willingness to pay as put forward by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) . Figure 5 indicates that debt value increases in a non-proportional way with recovery value. This underlines the importance of collateral in enhancing sovereign debt capacity and reducing default risk. However, debt Laffer curves are homothetic in Figure 5 , which indicates that collateral does not increase the potential gains from renegotiations. Finally, debt value increases with the bank bargaining power as the lender extracts a bigger portion of the renegotiations surplus (see Figure 6 ).
The debt rescheduling deal
In this section we examine the debt rescheduling deal. This deal consists in delaying interest payments to allow the sovereign to recover from her temporary financial distress. To simplify the exposition, we consider a deal where the entire debt service is postponed for a time period T (that is from
Afterwards, the sovereign resumes interests payments. We call the period T the moratorium.
Sovereign debt value
By contrast with the debt reduction deal, the debt rescheduling deal maintains the present value of debt in the actuarial sense upon renegotiations 
and N (.) stands for the normal cumulative distribution function.
Endogenous moratorium
The moratorium on which both parties agree is determined as the solution of a Nash bargaining game. When q reaches H * , the bank will forsake the recovery value αs/r in exchange of a non-renegotiable debt that starts paying . Hence, the incremental value accruing to the lender is
In case of a successful rescheduling deal, the surplus accruing to the sovereign is formally given by
The term W 
The debt rescheduling horizon T satisfies
and is solved numerically. 
The value of renegotiable debt
We conduct the same analysis as for the debt reduction deal using base case parameters defined in Figure 2 . Simulations are reported in Figure 8 . For each simulation, the default threshold H * and the rescheduling horizon T * are derived endogenously.
In case of a debt rescheduling deal, we still obtain the humped debt Laffer curve (see Figure 8 ). Although the debt Laffer curve seems to be of same magnitude as that of debt subject to reduction deal, we shall investigate the difference in debt values in the next section. From Figure 8 , we see that the top of the debt Laffer curve corresponds to a debt-to-exports ratio of around 90% as for the debt reduction case. The fact that renegotiations are beneficial to lenders long before the sovereign is "severely indebted" holds for different types of renegotiations and is not specific to debt reduction schemes. Other behaviours of debt value are similar to those in the case of debt reduction, so we do not report them.
Comparing reduction and rescheduling deals
In this section, we investigate the renegotiations policy that lenders should implement in order to minimize sovereign default risk. Historically, the Baker plan based on a debt rescheduling logic was replaced by the Brady plan which favors debt reduction agreements. Still, some recent deals mixed debt reduction with debt rescheduling schemes. We show in this section that, although debt reduction plans induce higher debt values in most situations, some exceptions exist and the case by case approach should be favored.
To motivate this, we analyze the difference in value between debt that may be reduced and debt that may be rescheduled. Figures 9 to 11 report these values. Figure 9 indicates that the debt Laffer curve for debt subject to rescheduling is below that of debt subject to debt reduction. On the "good" side of the curve, the two debt values are equal. On the top of the curve, default risk affects most debt subject to rescheduling. Then, on the "wrong" side, the difference in debt value remains constant. This difference arises from the rescheduling mechanism. If at the end of the moratorium, the sovereign exits, then renegotiations will have been useless ex post and the lender loses the discounting of the recovery value.
We then set s = 15, i.e. near the top of the debt Laffer curve, and examine the difference in debt values as a function of the model input parameters. As expected, this difference tends to zero as r → 0 (the lender no longer loses the discounting of the recovery value), as µ → r and q → ∞ (both debts become riskless), and as η → 0 (with no bargaining power, the type of deal does not matter to the bank anymore). Also this difference remains unchanged for various m since the exposure to sanctions modifies the sovereign default policy in the same way for both debts. Most interesting cases are reported in Figures 10 and 11 . Debt subject to rescheduling may become most valuable when exports volatility or recovery value get high and we now discuss these two cases.
First, both types of renegotiable debt contain the option to avoid the exit deal. The value of this option increases with exports volatility. In the long run however, exports volatility also raises the chances to default once renegotiations have occurred. This explains the humped shape of Figure 10 .
But the long run effect is less pronounced for debt subject to rescheduling.
Indeed, after renegotiations, the lender has to wait during the moratorium to know if the sovereign resumes paying or not. Increasing volatility raises the chances that exports will be above the new exit threshold. Our model therefore implies that debt rescheduling deals should be favored by banks when the sovereign access to international trade is very volatile.
Second, as the recovery value increases, the benefits of the reduction deal tend to disappear. On the other hand, those of the rescheduling deal also shrink since the lender is likely to lose the discounting of the recovery value.
However, the first effect dominates: as α increases, both debts converge to the riskless equivalent debt, but debt subject to rescheduling converges faster.
Our model therefore implies that debt rescheduling deals should be favored by banks when they are able to recover a substantial proportion of debt in case of sovereign default.
Conclusion
We have presented a contingent claims model of sovereign debt that incorporates the possibility to renegotiate once the terms of the contract. Renegotiations take the form of a debt reduction (as implemented by the Brady plan)
or of a debt rescheduling (as used to be fostered by the Baker plan). The model quantifies the benefits of renegotiations. Simulation results indicate that both reduction and rescheduling deals allow the lender and the sovereign to move away from the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve well before the sovereign is highly indebted according to international lending organizations standards.
In addition, the model allows for a direct comparison of the benefits of debt reduction and debt rescheduling schemes. We find that in most cases debt reduction deals are most efficient in lowering sovereign default risk, 
C. Sovereign surplus
At the time of renegotiations, sovereign wealth upon a debt rescheduling deal may be written as Debt values subject to a reduction deal or a rescheduling deal are respectively plotted with a thin line and a dashed line.
